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Germany	is	quietly	rebalancing	its	economy	–	but	this
will	not	fix	the	Eurozone’s	flaws
Ever	since	the	financial	and	sovereign	debt	crisis,	the	political	and	economic	implications	of	Germany’s	unbalanced
economy	have	lured	the	attention	of	academics,	policy	institutions,	the	public	and	politicians	across	Europe	and
beyond.	Frequent	are	the	pleas	made	to	the	German	political	establishment	to	rebalance	its	export-oriented
economic	model,	increase	fiscal	expenditures	and	thus	rein	in	the	world’s	largest	current	account	surplus.
But	what	is	Germany	being	criticised	for?	In	essence,	the	controversy	revolves	around	macroeconomic	policy	making
and	what	the	German	growth	model	implies	for	the	rest	of	the	world.	There	are	four	constitutive	elements	in	this
debate.	Two	pertain	to	the	sphere	of	macroeconomic	policy	proper,	i.e.	wage	and	fiscal	policy.	One	has	to	do	with	an
empirical	manifestation	of	macroeconomic	policy	in	the	German	balance	of	trade,	i.e.	persistent	current	account
surpluses.	The	last	criticism	is	centered	on	the	growth	model	itself	and	considers	the	implications	of	the	German
export	Weltmeister	for	the	European	Economic	and	Monetary	Union	(EMU)	(as	well	as	global	imbalances).
Germany’s	‘unbalanced’	economy	and	the	EMU
German	policy	makers,	the	argument	goes,	should	rein	in	the	country’s	trade	surplus	and	allow	for	symmetric
adjustments	in	the	EMU.	Germany	is	accused	of	engineering	economic	growth	at	home	by	free-riding	on	other
European	countries’	aggregate	demand.	Some	even	go	as	far	as	to	argue	that	Germany	is	“artificially”	and
“purposefully”	repressing	domestic	household	consumption,	government	spending	and	private	investments	to	sustain
a	mercantilist	model.	Germany	allegedly	refuses	to	correct	trade	imbalances	and	–	given	fixed	exchange	rates	–
grows	at	the	expense	of	other	EMU	participants,	which	have	to	go	through	painful	internal	devaluations	and	fiscal
austerity.	What	is	thus	being	asked	of	Germany	is	to	reduce	its	trade	and	budget	surpluses	to	provide	a	more
symmetric	adjustment	mechanism	to	the	single	currency	via	the	expansion	of	its	domestic	demand	for	EMU	exports.
In	the	eyes	of	the	critics,	Germany’s	increased	imports	are	supposed	to	work	as	a	functional	equivalence	for	the	lack
of	a	supranational	adjustment	mechanism	in	the	monetary	union.	In	other	words,	Germany	should	act	as	a	“fixer	of
last	resort”	in	the	Eurozone	and,	to	fulfill	this	role,	domestic	macroeconomic	policy	should	follow	suit.	Since
participating	in	the	EMU	entails	a	loss	of	sovereignty	over	exchange	rate	and	monetary	policies,	both	criticism	and
policy	advice	focus	on	wage	and	fiscal	policy.
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Let’s	start	with	the	criticism.	People	concerned	with	wage	policy	argue	that	Germany	has	undergone	a	substantial
internal	devaluation	of	its	real	unit	labour	costs:	real	wages	have	fallen	behind	productivity	rates	in	both	the	private
and	public	sector,	thus	yielding	a	cost	and	price	competitiveness	premium	to	the	German	export	sector.	Those	who
point	at	fiscal	policy	stress	the	German	budget	surplus,	bemoaning	the	lack	of	government	spending.	Deflationary
wage	policies	are	said	to	deter	household	consumption	at	home	and	imports	from	abroad.	An	austere	fiscal	policy
contains	the	government’s	final	consumption	and	contributes	to	keeping	imports	artificially	low.	At	any	rate,	the
combination	of	a	restrictive	wage	and	fiscal	stance	represses	total	domestic	demand	(public	and	private),	leads	to
relatively	low	inflation,	real	exchange	rates	competitiveness	and	trade	surpluses	–	which	prevent	the	possibility	of
other	EMU	participants	adjusting	via	an	export-led	recovery.
Now	the	policy	advice:	what	should	Germany	do?	Policy	remedies	follow	consistently	from	the	critiques.	Real	unit
labour	costs	in	Germany	should	rise	faster	than	its	competitors’.	Additionally,	the	German	government	should	spend
more	money.	The	effects	of	this	policy	mix	would	set	in	motion	two	complementary	mechanisms	for	adjustment.	On
the	one	hand,	the	inflation	deriving	from	higher	real	unit	labour	costs	and	an	expansionary	fiscal	stance	will	decrease
real	exchange	rate	competitiveness	and	help	rebalance	the	current	account	–	allowing	other	EMU	countries	to
“breathe”.	On	the	other,	increased	households	and	government	consumption	will	increase	domestic	demand	and
imports	from	abroad.
Germany	is	already	rebalancing	its	economy
In	general	terms,	the	criticism	on	such	a	high	current	account	surplus	is	certainly	valid.	Yet,	what	the	critiques	have	is
common	is	that	they	do	not	ask	what	Germany	has	done	so	far	to	address	these	issues.	Scapegoating	is	generally
easier	than	qualified	reasoning	so	let	us	consider	wage	and	fiscal	policy	in	post-crisis	Germany.
Real	unit	labour	costs	have	increased,	slowly	but	steadily.	In	relative	terms,	Germany	has	undergone	an	internal
appreciation	vis-à-vis	its	trading	partners	of	approximately	5%,	as	compared	to	2010.	Surely,	criticising	Germany	for
its	own	sake	may	lead	to	one	always	asking	“how	much	is	enough”.	But	then	one	should	elaborate	on	the	entity	of	a
higher	revaluation	and	–	most	importantly	–	on	the	feasibility	of	such	an	option	given	the	German	wage	setting
systems.	Tarifautonomie	allows	for	no	government	interference	in	private	sector	wage	negotiations.	Regarding	public
sector	wage	setting,	after	the	reforms	of	the	mid-2000s	it	is	now	the	finance	ministers	of	the	Länder	who	are	in
charge	of	negotiating	wage	increases	for	the	public	employees	they	are	in	charge	with,	i.e.	the	majority.
Given	that	the	Länder	lack	the	possibility	to	manipulate	their	marginal	tax	revenues,	it	would	be	pointless	to	expect
substantial	wage	increases	in	the	TV-L	contract	without	a	fiscal	federalism	reform	that	attributes	more	money	to
subnational	governments.	Even	more	fundamental	is	that	it	is	unclear	why	one	should	expect	the	finance	minister	of
a	German	State	to	respond	to	Eurozone	imperatives,	while	being	accountable	to	their	local	constituency.	The	only
instrument	the	German	government	could	use	to	intervene	in	wage	setting	is	to	legislate	for	an	increase	of	the
minimum	wage	above	inflation.	This	has	already	been	agreedand	the	government	is	about	to	ratify	an	above-inflation
increase	of	4%.
Even	admitting	that	it	would	be	structurally	possible	to	raise	German	price	inflation	far	above	the	EMU	average	via
wage	push	inflation,	this	is	likely	to	create	more	damage	than	relief.	Given	Germany’s	size	in	the	EMU,	it	will	rather
put	enormous	political	pressures	on	the	soon-to-be	new	governor	of	the	ECB	to	tighten	monetary	policy.	The	effect
for	the	EMU	would	be	devastating.
Figure	1:	Real	unit	labour	costs:	total	economy	(2010=100)
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What	about	the	German	finance	ministers,	are	they	really	so	stingy?	In	terms	of	real	government	expenditures	(net	of
interest	payments),	Germany	has	since	the	crisis	spent	considerably	more	than	most	other	OECD	countries,	almost
twice	as	much	as	the	increase	in	spending	in	the	United	States	–	often	praised	for	its	post-crisis	Keynesian	stance.
The	truth	is	that	focusing	on	the	budget	surplus	is	misleading	since,	in	a	buoyant	economy,	it	is	relatively	faster
growth	of	revenues	that	drives	the	calculation	up.	Surely	enough,	again	one	can	ask	how	much	is	enough.	But,	after
all,	didn’t	Keynes	say	at	some	point	that	hoarding	money	in	good	times	is	functional	to	governments’	countercyclical
spending	in	hard	ones?
Figure	2:	Real	total	expenditure	excluding	interest	of	general	government	(2008=100,	3	years	moving	average)
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What	about	Germany’s	current	account	surplus	vis-à-vis	its	European	partners	in	the	single	market?	Ever	since	the
crisis,	German	exports	of	goods	to	the	EU	have	decreased	substantially	relative	to	its	imports.	The	intra-EU
export/imports	ratio	has	been	going	down	significantly.	In	fact,	the	core	countries	of	the	EMU,	together	with	the
Visegrád	Group,	show	a	higher	exports/imports	ratio	than	Germany.	Also,	countries	of	Southern	Europe	have
arguably	found	a	market	for	their	export-led	adjustment.	Their	ratio	has	increased	considerably	even	though	they
continue	to	import	more	than	they	export.
Figure	3:	Intra-EU	exports	divided	by	intra-EU	imports	(2002-16)
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So,	where	does	the	German	current	account	surplus	come	from?	Surely	neither	from	the	EU	single	market,	nor	the
Euro	Area.	Ever	since	summer	2008,	Germany’s	trade	surplus	with	EMU	partners	has	disappeared	and	the	current
account	surplus	has	been	driven	solely	by	extra-EMU	trade.	In	this	sense,	Germany	quietly	“exited”	the	euro	in	2008
to	then	assail	international	markets	in	2011.	This	makes	Donald	Trump	and	his	colleagues	very	angry.	Global
imbalances	are	indeed	a	serious	issue	in	advanced	capitalism	and	others	have	addressed	the	topic	elsewhere.
Figure	4:	German	trade	balances	with	the	Euro	Area	and	Extra-Euro	Area	partners	(1999-2018)
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As	far	as	the	single	market	is	concerned,	Germany	is	virtually	the	largest	importer	for	all	its	members.	Germany
already	provides	a	very	wide	market	for	EMU	exports.	Will	asking	Germany	to	slow	down	its	export	engine	benefit
the	EMU?	I	think	it	is	hard	to	tell.	Possibly,	it	is	instead	likely	to	reduce	German	imports	from	its	EU	trade	partners.
Overall,	it	seems	that	accusing	Germany	for	not	providing	a	sufficiently	large	import	market	for	European	goods	is,
simply,	wrong.
Figure	5:	Top-three	partners	of	each	member	state	in	intra-EU	exports	of	goods	(2016)
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Is	economic	growth	in	Germany	driven	by	exports,	i.e.	net	trade	(exports	minus	imports)?	Or,	in	other	words,	does
Germany	“steal”	growth	from	abroad?	When	decomposing	GDP	growth	in	the	aftermath	of	the	crisis,	we	ascertain
that	export-led	growth	seems	to	be	an	historical	parenthesis	rather	than	a	structural	feature	of	the	German	economy.
GDP	growth	was	strongly	driven	by	exports	during	2001-2007.	In	the	aftermath	of	the	crisis,	given	real	wage	growth
and	increased	government	expenditures,	GDP	growth	has	been	driven	by	household	consumption,	public	and
private	investment.	Yes,	the	export	share	in	total	GDP	remains	high	in	relative	terms,	but	data	shows	that	exports
have	not	contributed	so	much	to	the	post-crisis	German	engine.
Figure	6:	Contributions	of	different	components	of	aggregate	demand	to	change	of	GDP	(1996-2019)
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Does	this	mean	that	Germany	is	safe	and	sound?	No.	Rather,	an	incomplete	EMU	remains	fragile	and	requires
upkeep.	If	German	politicians	want	others	to	stop	blaming	Germany	for	everything	that	occurs	in	the	EMU,	they
should	venture	into	a	serious	EMU	reform	plan	that	envisages	blühende	Landschaften	for	Europe	as	a	whole	and	not
for	Germany	alone.	Whether	they	like	it	or	not,	they	belong	to	a	common	project	now.
To	avoid	any	misunderstanding:	I	am	not	arguing	that	the	German	current	account	and	fiscal	surpluses	are	good	and
desirable.	The	aim	here	is	to	show	empirically	that,	contrary	to	what	is	usually	claimed,	Germany	has	made	important
steps	towards	a	“quiet”	rebalancing.	This	is	good	news	and	should	be	kept	in	mind	if	we	aspire	to	having	constructive
politics	in	the	EU.
But	it	would	be	a	mistake	to	insist	that	Keynesianism	in	Germany	will	fix	the	Eurozone’s	problems:	Germany	should
not	and	cannot	be	the	fixer	of	last	resort	for	the	single	currency.	Supranational	adjustment	mechanisms	are	needed
for	the	stabilisation	of	the	Eurozone	in	hard	times.	There	seems	to	be	one	priority	around	which	accusers	and
defendants	can	and	should	come	together:	to	avoid	macroeconomic	adjustments	based	solely	on	the	compression	of
wages	and	public	investment.
Two	institutional	changes	could	serve	the	purpose.	Broadly	speaking,	a	pan-European	unemployment	benefit
scheme	based	on	national	PPPs	would	work	as	an	automatic	stabiliser	to	support	household	consumption	when
countries	most	in	need	are	forced	to	switch	them	off	in	their	budgets.	Secondly,	one	could	imagine	an	ECB	that
supports	a	European	Growth	Bond	by	the	European	Investment	Bank	in	the	context	of	a	proper	European
Investment	Plan.	Unfortunately,	the	importance	of	both	these	reforms	for	the	stabilisation	of	the	EMU	has	been
eclipsed	by	the	attempts	to	create	a	Capital	Markets	Union	to	engineer	a	financial	fix	to	the	structural	flaws	of	the
EMU.
♣♣♣
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